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Abstract: The rule of temporary refuge forms the cornerstone of states’ 
response in cases of large-scale influx of refugees. In the context of civilians 
fleeing armed conflict, this legal rule imposes a positive obligation on all states 
to admit and not to return anyone to a situation of risk to life, and to provide 
basic rights commensurate with human dignity. Also implicit in the rule is the 
expectation of shared responsibility for large numbers of refugees and 
international cooperation towards durable solutions. This article examines the 
customary international law of temporary refuge (also known as temporary 
protection) in relation to the Syrian conflict. It discusses implementation of the 
rule in the practices of three neighbouring countries to Syria, and in the EU. It 
finds Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan to have engaged in practices consistent 
with the rule of temporary refuge. However, the EU decided not to use the 
Temporary Protection Directive; instead individual member states have relied 
on the Refugee Convention and EU law, combined with various other 
measures not pertinent to temporary protection. It concludes that shared 
responsibility is the linchpin of temporary refuge. Absent this keystone, the 
rule of temporary refuge is likely to continue being implemented primarily in a 
regional context by countries the nearest to the country affected by conflict, as 
seen in the case of Syria. 
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There is nothing new about mass flight from war, or the mass movement of 
people across borders. Refugee crises are a recurring phenomenon, 2 yet 
large-scale influxes have long posed an acute challenge to countries 
implementing their obligations under the 1951 Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees3 (Refugee Convention) using asylum procedures because 
these are designed to assess in detail individual applications for protection 
                                                        
1  Professor of International Law, University of Westminster, London. I am 
grateful to Ella Gunn (MSc in Refugee Studies, Oxford) for her research 
assistance, to the participants of the Refugee Law Initiative 1st Annual 
Conference for their feedback, and to the anonymous reviewers for their 
detailed and helpful comments. 
2 P Gatrell, The Making of the Modern Refugee (Oxford University Press 
2013). 
3 189 UNTS 150. The Convention was updated by the 1967 Protocol Relating 
to the Status of Refugees (606 UNTS 267). 
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and to grant permanent asylum 4 (subject to the invocation of a cessation 
clause).5 Hence, the Refugee Convention, although in principle relevant, is 
not necessarily the most suitable framework for dealing with flight from armed 
conflict or massive violation of human rights that result in a large number of 
individual claims for asylum.6 
Other salient reasons for the limited suitability of the Refugee 
Convention include the absence of a positive obligation to offer admission to 
territory,7 the circumstances of flight which may not at first sight be covered by 
the Refugee Convention, 8  and the lack of ratification of the Refugee 
Convention by certain states (e.g., Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, 
Oman, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates).  
 
Anticipating these limitations, the drafters of the Refugee Convention 
 
expresse[d] the hope that the Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees will have value as an example exceeding its contractual 
scope and that all nations will be guided by it in granting so far as 
possible to persons in their territory as refugees and who would not be 
covered by the terms of the Convention, the treatment for which it 
provides.9 
                                                        
4  This is not the case in countries with a procedure for refugee status 
determination that uses prima facie as ‘a specific rule of evidence’, J-F 
Durieux and A Hurwitz, ‘How many is too many? African and European legal 
responses to mass influxes of refugees’, 47 (2004) German Yearbook of 
International Law 105-159, at 119.  
5 Article 1C, Refugee Convention. 
6 Fitzpatrick talks about refugee law becoming ‘increasingly irrelevant as a 
solution, especially in situation of mass influx’, J Fitzpatrick, ‘Flight from 
Asylum: Trends Towards Temporary “Refuge” and Local Responses to 
Forced Migration’, 16 (1995) Immigration and Nationality Law Review 407-
464, at 410. 
7 E.g., states may refuse entry to stowaways and refugees rescued at sea or 
by application of the ‘safe third country’ concept without necessarily breaching 
the principle of non-refoulement in Article 33 of the Refugee Convention; GS 
Goodwin-Gill and J McAdam, The Refugee in International Law (Oxford 
University Press, 3rd edition, 2007) 267. See also GJL Coles, ‘Temporary 
Refuge and the Large Scale of Influx of Refugees’, 8 (1980) Australian 
Yearbook of International Law 189-212, at 195 arguing that ‘admission on a 
temporary basis facilitates the implementations of the principle of non-
refoulement’ (at 196). 
8 The Convention defines a refugee as a person with a ‘well-founded fear of 
being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group, or political opinion’ (Article 1A(2)). According to the 
UNHCR, the violence characterising most modern conflicts is motivated by or 
conducted along lines of race, ethnicity, religion, politics or social group 
ground, or impacts people for the same reasons. However, national decision-
makers regularly fail to see it that way. UNHCR Guidelines on International 
Protection No.12, HCR/GIP/16/12 (02 December 2016), paras.1, 35, 36. 
9 Final Act of the Conference of Plenipotentiaries, para.E. 
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Furthermore, Preamble to the Refugee Convention expressly provides 
 
that the grant of asylum may place unduly heavy burdens on certain 
countries, and that a satisfactory solution … cannot therefore be 
achieved without international cooperation.10 
 
Possibly inspired by these provisions and pre-existing humanitarian 
tradition (such as rescuing persons in distress at sea11), or indeed by the 
promise of preventing permanent integration,12 temporary refuge developed 
as a key element of states’ response towards victims of armed conflict or 
massive violation of human rights. 
The practice of temporary refuge emerged in the early part of the twentieth 
century and was soon extended to many parts of the world to provide a 
practical, humane, and immediate solution in cases of large-scale influx of 
refugees, pending the finding of a permanent home.13 Thus, it was always 
meant to be a short-term solution to an emergency situation. It has generally 
been applied for the duration of the conflict.14 However, due to the excessive 
length of some armed conflicts, temporary refuge has in some cases 
developed into de facto permanent resettlement in the country of refuge (e.g., 
the conflict in Afghanistan since 1979 that has resulted in temporary 
protection being offered for an indefinite duration by Pakistan).15  
It has been identified as a rule of customary international law by numerous 
scholars, based on a considerable amount of consistent state practice across 
the globe, accepted as law. 16  It has since grown into what is known as 
                                                        
10 Preamble, 1951 Refugee Convention, Recital 4. 
11  GS Goodwin-Gill, ‘Non-Refoulement, Temporary Refuge, and the ‘New’ 
Asylum Seekers’, in Cantor and Durieux (eds) Refuge from Inhumanity? War 
Refugees and International Humanitarian Law (Brill/Nijhoff 2014) at 441-2. 
12 MJ Gibney, ‘Between Control and Humanitarianism: Temporary Protection 
in Contemporary Europe’, 14 (2000) Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 
689-707, at 690 arguing that European states may have been motivated by 
two main objectives: the ‘humanitarian objective’ and the ‘control objective’, 
when offering temporary protection. 
13 P Weis, ‘The International Protection of Refugees’, 48 (1954) American 
Journal of International Law 193, at 196. Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, The 
Refugee in International Law, 289.  
14 Gibney, ‘Between Control and Humanitarianism’, at 689. 
15  D Perluss and JF Hartman, ‘Temporary Refuge: Emergence of a 
Customary Norm’, 26 (1986) Virginia Journal of International Law 551-626, at 
564 and 598. 
16  Perluss and Hartman, ‘Temporary Refuge: Emergence of a Customary 
Norm’, 551-626 – a shorter version of this article, with a more US focus, was 
published by JF Hartman, ‘The Principle and Practice of Temporary Refuge: A 
Customary Norm Protecting Civilians Fleeing Internal Armed Conflict’ in DA 
Martin (ed) The New Asylum Seekers: Refugee Law in the 1980s (Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1988), 87-101; GS Goodwin-Gill, ‘Non-Refoulement and the New 
Asylum Seekers’, 26 (1986) Virginia Journal of International Law 897-918 – 
reproduced in DA Martin (ed) The New Asylum Seekers, 103-121. 
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temporary protection,17 but the reality of protracted conflicts and the issue of 
non-return have ‘exercised powerful influence’ on what countries (particularly 
Western countries) are prepared to offer. 18  This article uses the phrase 
‘temporary refuge’ throughout in order to emphasize the customary nature of 
the rule; it uses the phrase ‘temporary protection’ only where states and/or 
international organizations expressly refer to it as such.  
This article focuses on temporary refuge as a rule of customary 
international law, separate and independent from treaties of refugee law and 
non-refoulement, and binding on all states. It examines the practical 
application of temporary refuge to ‘war refugees’ today. With ‘15 conflicts 
either erupted or re-ignited over the past five years’,19 the empirical focus is 
refugees from the Syrian Arab Republic (Syria) conflict. The United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has described the situation as 
‘the world's single largest driver of forced displacement with half of the 
population displaced’ (approximately 12 million).20  
Temporary refuge is a ‘diverse and multifaceted’ phenomenon, with ‘no 
single manifestation, purpose or character’.21 Thus, Section II begins with 
clarifying the scope of temporary refuge (both ratione personae and ratione 
temporae) by reference to evidence of practices worldwide analysed in the 
scholarship. This section also discusses UNGA resolutions, UNHCR EXCOM 
conclusions, and case law of international courts as further evidence of the 
normative character of such practice. Section III briefly discusses pertinent 
elements of the current practices that may be framed as pursuant to the 
customary obligation of temporary refuge (as opposed to treaty or EU law) in 
the context of Syria. It signals that in the case of EU countries, state practice 
is primarily rooted in treaty law (e.g., the Refugee Convention) or EU law. 
Section IV examines implementation of the existing customary obligation in 
the daily practice of three neighbouring countries to Syria (Jordan, Lebanon, 
and Turkey), where the vast majority of refugees are located. It then contrasts 
these practices with the response of the EU.  
The three neighbouring countries to Syria were selected for legal and 
geopolitical reasons. Turkey, despite having ratified both the Refugee 
Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees 
(Refugee Protocol), maintains a geographical limitation to the effect that only 
                                                        
17 K Kerber, ‘Temporary Protection in the European Union: Chronology’, 14 
(2000) Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 35-50; D Luca, ‘Questioning 
Temporary Protection’, 6 (1994) International Journal of Refugee Law 535. 
18 Gibney, ‘Between Control and Humanitarianism’, 692. 
19 E.g., in Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, 
Libya, Nigeria, South Sudan, Ukraine, Yemen etc. UNHCR currently 
estimates over 60 million people as forcibly displaced; the highest number 
since WWII. ECRE interviews V Türk, ‘We should not forget history when 
addressing current challenges’, ECRE Weekly Bulletin, 23 October 2015. 
20 Of a total population of approximately 22 million before April 2011, over five 
million refugees are now living outside Syria, and seven million persons are 
internally displaced. UNHCR, ‘International Protection Considerations with 
Regard to People Felling the Syrian Arab Republic – Update IV’, November 
2015, para.8.  
21 Gibney, ‘Between Control and Humanitarianism’, 690. 
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asylum seekers from countries of the Council of Europe can be ‘Convention 
refugees’. Neither Lebanon nor Jordan has ratified the Refugee Convention 
and/or Refugee Protocol. Hence, the practice of these three countries is 
particularly relevant in examining custom-based practices independently from 
refugee treaty law; albeit human rights treaties may be pertinent. In contrast 
EU member states are all parties to the Refugee Convention and Refugee 
Protocol. 22 Hence, the challenge in the context of EU countries consists in 
identifying distinctive custom-based practices and not just current practices 
based on treaty and EU law. In addition, the position of the European Union, 
as a supra-national organisation (sui generis), is examined as further 
manifestations of state practice.  
Section V concludes on the pertinence and contours of the rule of 
temporary refuge for Syrian refugees and argues that, although anchored in 
understandings of shared responsibility, it has been implemented primarily in 
a regional context by countries proximate to Syria. 
 
II. THE SCOPE OF TEMPORARY REFUGE 
This section reviews academic authorities on relevant state practice, before 
considering the position of international organisations and international courts 




Temporary refuge has been described by Coles as a practice ‘to facilitate 
admission and the obtaining of satisfactory solutions’ in situations of such 
large-scale influx that problems of a humanitarian nature, public order, 
national security or even international peace and security may be at stake.23 It 
emerged at a time when state practice indicated that ‘the only sort of refuge 
was permanent asylum’.24  
From the start, it was premised on ‘polite or explicit quid pro quos’ that 
other countries than the countries of temporary refuge would screen and grant 
resettlement to a large proportion of the population; ‘[t]he promise of 
resettlement was the defining “temporary” element in the refuge offered by the 
states of first asylum, because the causes of flight were often of indefinite 
duration’. 25 For instance, in South Asia, the 1979 Agreement provided for 
                                                        
22 For a discussion on non-EU countries but close to the EU, such as Albania, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Georgia, Montenegro, the 
Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation, the former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia, Serbia, Kosovo, and Ukraine, see UNHCR, Syrian refugees in 
Europe: What Europe Can Do to Ensure Protection and Solidarity (July 2014), 
29-33. 
23 Coles, ‘Temporary Refuge and the Large Scale of Influx of Refugees’, at 
191. 
24 Goodwin-Gill, ‘Non-Refoulement, Temporary Refuge, and the ‘New’ Asylum 
Seekers’, at 433. 
25 J Fitzpatrick, ‘Flight from Asylum: Trends Toward Temporary “Refuge” and 
Local Responses to Forced Migrations’, 16 (1995) Immigration and Nationality 
Law Review 407-464, at 462. Note that the present article leaves out the 
issue of so-called ‘safety zones’, regarded as highly controversial (e.g., the 
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temporary asylum to refugees from Indochina on condition of resettlement in a 
third country; it was replaced by the Comprehensive Plan of Action in 1989.26   
In other instances, temporary refuge was provided (short-term) until voluntary 
repatriation could start, e.g., in Eastern Pakistan in 1971 following events 
resulting in the sudden arrival of some ten million refugees (‘evacuees’) into 
India.27 Should voluntary return not be possible or offers of resettlement not 
be forthcoming from the international community, material assistance to the 
countries of temporary refuge was expected and was generally given. 
It has often been argued by scholars that the obligation to provide 
temporary refuge in cases of mass influx finds its roots in the principle of non-
refoulement (Article 33, Refugee Convention), which covers persons fleeing 
armed conflict. 28  Less noted is the origin of this legal obligation in an 
emerging rule of customary international law of temporary refuge, distinct from 
refugee law and finding authority in a considerable amount of relevant state 
practice accepted as law.29  
Mushkat, for instance, one of the first scholars to have written about 
temporary refuge in 1982, appraised Hong Kong as a country-colony of 
temporary refuge for Vietnamese refugees, in comparison to its Asian 
neighbours and in the context of challenges associated with having ‘to cater’ 
for their needs on a long-term basis when the situation becomes protracted.30 
She explained that non-refoulement and temporary refuge share together ‘an 
obligation of states to permit entry’ but they differ significantly in that 
temporary refuge ‘appears to impose additional obligations on receiving 
                                                                                                                                                              
Allied forces Kurdish safe zone in Iraq, the UNSC safe areas in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and the UNSC secure humanitarian area in South-West 
Rwanda). 
26  WC Robinson, ‘The Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indochinese 
Refugees, 1989-1997: Sharing the Burden and Passing the Buck’, 17 (2004) 
Journal of Refugee Studies 319-333. See also, UNHCR, The State of the 
World’s Refugees 2000: Fifty Years of Humanitarian Action, 79-103. 
27 Coles, ‘Temporary Refuge and the Large Scale of Influx of Refugees’,192-
194. 
28  UNHCR EXCOM Conclusion 19 (XXXI) Temporary Refuge (1980); 
Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, The Refugee in International Law, at 290; Coles, 
‘Temporary Refuge and the Large Scale of Influx of Refugees’, 189-212; N 
Chandrahasan, ‘Precarious Refuge: A Study of the Reception of Tamil 
Asylum Seekers into Europe, North American and India’, 2 (1989) Harvard 
Human Rights Journal, 55-96 (arguing that India’s response towards Tamil 
asylum seekers in the late 1980s found legal basis in the norm of non-
refoulement); D Luca, ‘Questioning Temporary Protection’, 6 (1994) 
International Journal of Refugee Law, 535-537. 
29  Perluss and Hartman, ‘Temporary Refuge: Emergence of a Customary 
Norm’, 551-626; Goodwin-Gill, ‘Non-Refoulement and the New Asylum 
Seekers’, 897-918; J Fitzpatrick Hartman, ‘Temporary Refuge and Central 
American Refugees’, In Defense of the Alien (Centre Migration Studies, 1987) 
171-181. 
30 R Mushkat, ‘Hong Kong as a Country of Temporary Refuge: An Interim 
Analysis’, 12 (1982) Hong Kong Law Journal 157-178. 
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countries and is a more tangible step towards a durable solution’. 31  She 
further noted that despite the practice having ‘found expression – whether 
explicit or implicit – in a number of legal instruments’, there exists among 
states a ‘reluctance to institutionalise the phenomenon’, which she described 
as ‘avoidance of self-conscious choice’ so as not to undermine non-
refoulement and permanent asylum.32  
Four years later, Perluss and Hartman argued that ‘as a norm of 
customary humanitarian law, temporary refuge is far better equipped than 
current codified law to deal with situations of mass influx’ for practical and 
juridical reasons; it circumvents individualized determination of refugee status 
and it does not require the same level of factual evidence of persecution as 
under the Refugee Convention.33 They explained that the norm ‘has emerged 
out of the essential principle of humanitarian law: the balance between 
necessity and humanity’ 34  and it exists ‘at the point of intersection of … 
international humanitarian law, refugee law, and human rights law’. 35 The 
norm ‘resides within that portion of humanitarian law which remains 
uncodified’,36 i.e., the humanitarian law of rescue.  
Durieux develops the ‘rescue paradigm’ by reference to the discourse 
of disaster and emergency. For Durieux ‘the primary duty of frontline States’ 
must be conceptually separated from the duty of non-refoulement for reasons 
of fundamental fairness. 37 He proposes instead thinking about large refugee 
influxes as ‘complex emergencies’, whereby victims of disaster are not just 
the refugees themselves but also the frontline states and their population, and 
the ‘rescuer’ becomes all other states. 38  This idea resonates with the 
customary international law rule of temporary refuge, which is distinctly rooted 
in international cooperation and understandings of shared responsibility (see 
section II B below).39 
To be sure, state practice provides numerous instances where 
countries have obstructed access to protection (e.g., through push-back 
policies), but as Perluss and Hartman have argued, these must be seen as 
mere examples of states evading meeting their obligations under the rule, 
                                                        
31 Mushkat, ‘Hong Kong as a Country of Temporary Refuge’, at 159-160. See 
also Goodwin-Gill, ‘Non-Refoulement, Temporary Refuge, and the ‘New’ 
Asylum Seekers’, at 433-459. 
32 Mushkat, ‘Hong Kong as a Country of Temporary Refuge’, at 161-162. 
33 Perluss and Hartman, ‘Temporary Refuge’, 584. 
34 Ibid, 602. 
35  Ibid, 553. See also, JF Durieux, ‘Three Asylum Paradigms’ (2013) 20 
International Journal of Minority and Group Rights 165; Goodwin-Gill, ‘Non-
Refoulement, Temporary Refuge, and the ‘New’ Asylum Seekers’, in Cantor 
and Durieux (eds) Refuge from Inhumanity? at 448; J Moore, ‘Protection 
against the Forced Return of War Refugees’, in Cantor and Durieux (eds) 
Refuge from Inhumanity? at 413, referring to ‘humanitarian non-refoulement’. 
36 Perluss and Hartman, ‘Temporary Refuge’, at 607. 
37 JF Durieux, ‘The Duty to Rescue Refugees’, 28 (2016) International Journal 
of Refugee Law 637-655, at 640-641. 
38 Ibid, 643. 
39  A Hurwitz, The Collective Responsibility of States to Protect Refugees 
(Oxford University Press 2009). 
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nothing more.40 Thus, temporary refuge is clearly distinguished and detached 
from treaty law, that is, the Refugee Convention, and in Europe the EU 
Qualification Directive 41  and the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR). 42  The rule may (on occasion) overlap with the principle of non-
refoulement but the two are distinct.43 
Independently from its customary nature, the rule of temporary refuge 
has ‘crystallized’ in other sources of international law, reinforcing its normative 
character. The Organization of African Unity Convention, which extends 
protection to persons fleeing events such as external aggression or 
occupation, provides that 
 
Where a refugee has not received the right to reside in any country of 
asylum, he may be granted temporary residence in any country of 
asylum in which he first presented himself as a refugee pending 
arrangement for his resettlement.44 
 
The Cartagena Declaration, which also extends protection to persons 
fleeing situations of generalized violence, internal conflicts, or massive 
violations of human rights, emphasizes consideration of UNHCR EXCOM 
conclusions, particularly no. 22 on the Protection of Asylum Seekers in 
Situations of Large-Scale Influx (see section II B below). 45  As a result, 
practice relating to temporary refuge is quite considerable in Africa46 and Latin 
                                                        
40 Perluss and Hartman, ‘Temporary Refuge’, at 557 and 572. For a review of 
skeptical views on the rule, see Goodwin-Gill, ‘Non-Refoulement, Temporary 
Refuge, and the ‘New’ Asylum Seekers’, 433-459. 
41 Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for 
the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as 
refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the 
content of the protection granted, OJEU L 304/12, 30.9.2004, and Directive 
2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 
2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless 
persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for 
refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content 
of the protection granted (recast), OJEU L 337/9, 20.12.2011. 
42  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, Rome, 04 October 1950, E.T.S. no.5. 
43 Goodwin-Gill, ‘Non-Refoulement, Temporary Refuge, and the ‘New’ Asylum 
Seekers’, at 458. For a discussion of non-refoulement as customary 
international law and jus cogens, see C Costello and M Foster, ‘Non-
Refoulement as Custom and Jus Cogens? Putting the Prohibition to the Test’, 
46 (2016) Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 2015, 273-327. 
44  1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee 
Problems in Africa, 1001 UNTS 45, Article II(5) [emphasis added]. 
45 Article III(8). 
46 T Wood, ‘The African War Refugee: Using IHL to Interpret the 1969 African 
Refugee Convention’s Expanded Refugee Definition’, in Cantor and Durieux 
(eds) Refuge from Inhumanity? 179-203. 
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America47 where there has been large-scale influx from armed conflict and 
where group determination of prima facie refugee status is the norm. This has 
also been the case in India and other Asian countries.48  
The United States too has afforded protection against the return of large 
number of people fleeing armed conflict or natural disaster, be they from Haiti, 
Cuba, El Salvador, or Nicaragua.49 These ad hoc responses resulted in the 
adoption of Temporary Protected Status in 1990, which has even been 
granted in the context of environmental disasters, e.g., the earthquake in Haiti 
in 2010 or the volcanic eruptions in Montserrat in 1995 and 1997. This 
involved both admission and temporary status being provided to Haitian and 
Montserratian refugees by the United States, and a decision by other 
countries not to forcibly return those already within their territories.50 
Finally, in Europe, states have long afforded some form of protection on a 
temporary basis to persons fleeing armed conflict who fell outside the 
framework of the Refugee Convention (de facto refugees). For instance, 
Austria temporarily hosted large numbers of refugees from Czechoslovakia in 
1968 while solutions for permanent settlement in Western countries were 
found.51 The practice of de facto humanitarian status increased significantly in 
the late 1970s and 1980s52 to reach considerable magnitude in the 1990s 
following the wars in the former Yugoslavia and Kosovo. Some countries 
introduced a policy of temporary protection as a way to cope with ‘an all-time 
high’ numbers of asylum seekers. 53  Over half a million thereby received 
temporary protection in Germany, with large numbers also going to Austria, 
Sweden and Switzerland, pending their return home after the war.  The great 
disparity between EU countries in the numbers of refugees received prompted 
numerous calls for ‘burden sharing’ from the most affected countries, the 
                                                        
47 D  Cantor and D Mora, ‘A Simple Solution to War Refugees? The Latin 
American Expanded Definition and its Relationship to IHL’, in Cantor and 
Durieux (eds) Refuge from Inhumanity? War Refugees and International 
Humanitarian Law (Brill/Nijhoff 2014), 204-224. 
48 N Chandrahasan, ‘Precarious Refuge: A Study of the Reception of Tamil 
Asylum Seekers into Europe, North American and India’, 2 (1989) Harvard 
Human Rights Journal 55-96. See now, Asian-African Legal Consultative 
Organization (AALCO), ‘Bangkok Principles on the Status and Treatment of 
Refugees’ (Bangkok Principles), 31 December 1966, adopted on 24 June 
2001 at the AALCO’s 40th Session, New Delhi. 
49 J Fitzpatrick, ‘Flight from Asylum: Trends Toward Temporary “Refuge” and 
Local Responses to Forced Migrations’, 16 (1995) Immigration and Nationality 
Law Review 407-464, at 438-443. 
50 S Martin, A Schoenholtz, and D Waller Meyers, ‘Temporary Protection: 
Towards a New Regional and Domestic Framework’, 12 (1998) Georgetown 
Immigration Law Journal 543-587. 
51 Gibney, ‘Between Control and Humanitarianism’, 689. See also H Lambert, 
Seeking Asylum: Comparative Law and Practice in Selected European 
Countries (Martinus Nijhoff 1995) 126-144. 
52  E.g., Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 773 
(1976). 
53  G Loescher, The UNHCR and World Politics: A Perilous Path (Oxford 
University Press 2001), 315. 
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European Union, and the Council of Europe, 54  leading eventually to the 
adoption of a EU Directive on Temporary Protection.55 
Because it has developed from general practice accepted as law, the 
exact contours and content of temporary refuge have never been entirely 
clear as some countries confine beneficiaries of temporary refuge to camps 
whereas other countries offer far more, even in some cases refugee status or 
a status akin to it.56 The premise of temporary refuge (in terms of durable 
solutions) has also varied, namely eventual return to the country of origin (the 
model in Europe during the 1990s) by contrast with resettlement in a third 
country and only later repatriation (the model used in the case of Indochina).57 
As will be apparent from section IV below, EU countries have been 
reluctant to provide large-scale resettlement, and return is likely to remain the 
model in Europe given that cessation provisions are now increasingly invoked 
and proposals have been forward for a systematic and ‘compulsory status 
review’ mechanism of international protection statuses. 58  The practices of 
neighbouring countries to Syria on the other hand suggest temporary refuge 
at work; these practices echo the duty imposed by international law for the 
nearest country to provide a ‘place of safety’ to those persons rescued at 
sea.59 
 
B. International organisations  
                                                        
54 J Thorburn, ‘Transcending Boundaries: Temporary Protection and Burden-
Sharing in Europe’, 7 (1995) International Journal of Refugee Law 459-479. 
55 Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for 
giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons 
and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in 
receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof (OJEU L 212, 
7.8.2001). 
56 According to Perluss and Hartman, the norm of temporary refuge itself 
‘does not require a regularization of legal status’, for example through 
permanent asylum and the acquisition of nationality (at 597-598). However, 
should the armed conflict last, ‘the norm of temporary refuge may result in a 
de facto permanent resettlement in the refuge state’ through integration, i.e., 
asylum, or resettlement elsewhere (at 598). 
57 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, The Refugee in International Law, at 340-41. 
See also Gibney ‘Between Control and Humanitarianism’. Thorburn too has 
questioned Europe’s focus on return in its formulation of policies to manage 
refugees from former Yugoslavia, i.e., on the ‘temporary’ rather than the 
‘protection’ aspect of the phenomenon, in J Thorburn, ‘Transcending 
Boundaries: Temporary Protection and Burden-Sharing in Europe’, 7 (1995) 
International Journal of Refugee Law 459-479, at 459-460. 
58 Article 1C(5) of the Refugee Convention and Articles 11 and 16 of the 
Qualification Directive; see also Proposal for a Qualification Regulation 
introducing a ‘compulsory status review’ mechanism that would lead to 
increased cases of return to countries of origin COM(2016) 466 final, 13 July 
2016, 2016/0223 (COD), at 14. 
59 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, The Refugee in International Law, 279. See 
also Durieux, ‘The Duty to Rescue Refugees’, at 643. 
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International organisations have long recognised the imperative for states to 
offer temporary refuge for large numbers of people fleeing armed conflict. This 
imperative is reflected in UNGA resolutions and UNHCR EXCOM 
conclusions. Whilst this body of work does not constitute custom, it 
nonetheless provides evidence of the normative character of such practice.60 
A snapshot of UNGA instruments reveals several instances where the 
GA recommended states to offer provisional asylum or temporary refuge as a 
collective measure of solidarity. 61  For instance, UNGA Resolution 69/152 
(2014) 
 
Urges all States and relevant non-governmental and other 
organizations, in conjunction with the Office of the High Commissioner, 
in a spirit of international solidarity and burden-sharing, to cooperate 
and to mobilize resources, including through financial and in-kind 
assistance, as well as direct aid to host countries, refugee populations 
and the communities hosting them, with a view to enhancing the 
capacity of and reducing the heavy burden borne by countries and 
communities hosting refugees, in particular those that have received 
large numbers of refugees and asylum seekers, and whose generosity 
is appreciated’.62 
 
Pursuant to these policy directives, the UNHCR has played a leading role in 
the growing interest of states in temporary refuge.63 The UNHCR referred to 
‘temporary asylum’ for the first time in 1977,64 but the first explicit reference to 
temporary refuge in the context of mass-influx appears in EXCOM Conclusion 
15 (XXX) in 1979: ‘In cases of large-scale influx, persons seeking asylum 
should always receive at least temporary refuge’.65 The point was reaffirmed a 
                                                        
60  International Law Commission (ILC), Identification of customary 
international law, Text of the draft conclusions provisionally adopted by the 
Drafting Committee, 67th Session of the ILC, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.869, 14 July 
2015, draft conclusion 12. 
61 Article 3(3), UN General Assembly, Declaration on Territorial Asylum, 14 
December 1967, A/RES/2312(XXII); UNGA Resolution 37/195, OP4 18 Dec 
1982, para.4, adopted without vote; UNGA Resolution 49/169, OP7 23 Dec 
1994, para.7, adopted without vote. 
62 UNGA Resolution 69/152, OP39 18 Dec 2014 (emphasis added), adopted 
without a vote. 
63  UNHCR’s role is ‘one of guidance, supervisions, co-ordination and 
oversight’ to help states manage large numbers of refugees. C Lewis, 
UNHCR and International Refugee Law: From treaties to innovation 
(Routledge, 2012), 22. 
64 EXCOM Conclusion 5 (XXVI) Asylum (1977) (b); and again in EXCOM 
Conclusion 11 (XXIX) General (1978) (d) and EXCOM Conclusion 14 (XXX) 
General (1979) (c). Conclusions of the Executive Committee (EXCOM) of the 
UNHCR relating to temporary refuge constitute ‘expressions of opinion which 
are broadly representative of the views of the international community’ - these 
conclusions are taken by consensus). 
65 EXCOM Conclusion 15 (XXX) Refugees Without an Asylum Country (1979) 
(f). The first conclusion to refer to ‘temporary refuge’, it was adopted in the 
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few months later in EXCOM Conclusion 19 (XXXI) that also called for further 
study of the practice.66 Following a Group of Experts meeting on temporary 
refuge, EXCOM Conclusion 22 (XXXII) was adopted providing detailed 
provisions for protection and international solidarity, burden sharing and 
duties of states. 67  EXCOM Conclusion 23 (XXXII) is the last to refer to 
‘temporary refuge’,68 leading Fitzpatrick to write that ‘By 1985 the UNHCR had 
almost assimilated the norm of temporary refuge into the fundamental 
protection regime for refugees’.69 
The shift in label from temporary refuge to temporary protection dates 
back to 1992, 70 but the importance of temporary refuge, as expressed in 
EXCOM Conclusion 22 (XXXII), has continued to be reaffirmed ever since.71 
By then, temporary refuge was recognised ‘as a legitimate tool of international 
protection’, 72  a strategy for asylum clearly distinct from other forms of 
protection, such as complementary (or subsidiary) protection. 73  It was 
essentially aimed at unburdening asylum procedures in cases of mass influx 
and, for UNHCR it was distinctly anchored in international cooperation and 
responsibility sharing.74 
Notwithstanding this level of interest and involvement, by 2012, 
UNHCR conceded that ‘No consensus has however been reached on the 
situation in which temporary protection could be applied or its minimum 
content’. 75  Following two Roundtables on Temporary Protection, 76  the 
UNHCR adopted Guidelines elaborating on states’ duty to cooperate, to 
                                                                                                                                                              
aftermath of the Indochina crisis. See also, UNHCR, ‘Protection of persons of 
concern to UNHCR who fall outside the 1951 Convention: A Discussion Note’, 
UN doc EC/1992/SCP.CRP.5 (2 April 1992). 
66 EXCOM Conclusion 19 (XXXI) Temporary Refuge (1980) (c) and (e). 
67 EXCOM Conclusion No.22 (XXXII) Protection of Asylum-Seekers in 
Situations of Large-Scale Influx (1981). 
68 EXCOM Conclusion 23 (XXXII) Problems Related to the Rescue of Asylum-
Seekers in Distress at Sea (1981). 
69 Fitzpatrick, ‘Flight from Asylum’, at 436. 
70 EXCOM Conclusion 68 (XLIII) General (1992) (u). 
71 EXCOM Conclusion 71 (XLIV) General (1993) (m). 
72  With protection meaning ‘admission to safety, respect for basic human 
rights, protection against refoulement, and safe return when conditions permit 
to the country of origin’. EXCOM Conclusion 74 (XLV) General (1994) (r). 
73 UNHCR, The State of the World’s Refugees: The Challenge of Protection 
(Penguin, 1993), 41. 
74 EXCOM Conclusion 100 (LV) International Cooperation and Burden and 
Responsibility Sharing in Mass Influx Situations (2004). 
75  UNHCR, Roundtable on Temporary Protection 19-20 July 2012 
International Institute of Humanitarian Law, San Remo, Italy, Discussion 
Paper, para.1. 
76  UNHCR, Roundtable on Temporary Protection, 19-20 July 2012, San 
Remo, Italy, ‘Discussion Paper’ and ‘Summary Conclusions’; and UNHCR, 
Roundtable on Temporary Protection, 15-16 July 2013, San Remo, Italy, 
‘Concept Note’. Note that these were preceded by a UNHCR, Expert Meeting 
on International Cooperation to Share Burdens and Responsibilities, 28 June 
2011, Amman, Jordan. 
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protect against refoulement, and to provide basic minimum treatment pending 
durable solution.77 
The acknowledgement of ‘shared responsibility to manage large 
movements of refugees and migrants … through international cooperation’ 
was again made explicit in the New York Declaration for Refugees and 
Migrants, signed by 193 member states at the first UN Summit on Refugees 
and Migrants on 19 September 2016. 78  Although not expressly about 
temporary refuge, the Declaration acknowledges the disproportionate burden 
that protracted refugee crises and the resulting large movements of refugees 
place on countries of refuge and their communities. 79  The Declaration 
enshrines states’ commitment ‘to a more equitable sharing of the burden and 
responsibility for hosting and supporting the world’s refugees’, and empowers 
the UNHCR to develop and initiate a comprehensive refugee response.80  
 
C. International courts’ case law 
Decisions of international and national courts are subsidiary means for the 
determination of the rule of customary law.81 International courts’ decisions 
are scarce on the issue of temporary refuge. The International Court of 
Justice, although in theory competent to interpret the Refugee Convention, 
has never been called upon to do so; neither has it been seized to pronounce 
on a matter relating to temporary refuge.  
It is nevertheless worth noting that in the last decade, the European 
Court of Human Rights has extended its protective role to persons fleeing an 
armed conflict and for whom ‘substantial grounds’ exist for believing that they 
would face a ‘real risk’ of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR.82 The 
European Court of Human Rights recently ruled unanimously that the forced 
return of three asylum applicants (one stateless Palestinian from Syria and 
two Syrian nationals) to Syria would violate their right to life and lead to a real 
risk of torture or inhuman and degrading treatment under the ECHR.83 This is 
                                                        
77  UNHCR, Guidelines on Temporary Protection or Stay Arrangements 
(2014), reproduced in 27 (2015) International Journal of Refugee Law 157-
165 (with Introductory Note at 154-156). 
78 UNGA New York Declaration, A/71/L.1, 13 September 2016, para.11. See 
also, Volker Türk, ‘A Minor Miracle: A New Global Compact on Refugees’, 
Address at the Andrew & Renata Kaldor Centre for International Refugee 
Law, University of New South Wales, Sydney, 18 November 2016. 
79 UNGA New York Declaration, A/71/L.1, 13 September 2016, para.7.  
80 UNGA New York Declaration, A/71/L.1, 13 September 2016, para.68.  
81  ILC, Identification of customary international law, Text of the draft 
conclusions provisionally adopted by the Drafting Committee, 67th Session of 
the ILC, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.869, 14 July 2015,draft conclusion 13 (2015). 
82 NA v United Kingdom, application no25904/07, judgment of 17 July 2008; 
Sufi and Elmi v United Kingdom, applications no 8319/07 and 11449/07, 
judgment of 28 June 2011. See H Lambert, ‘The Next Frontier: Expanding 
Protection in Europe for Victims of Armed Conflict and Indiscriminate 
Violence’, 23 (2013) International Journal of Refugee Law 207-234 (also 
discussing the Court of Justice of the European Union case law). 
83 LM and others v Russia, application nos. 40081/14, 40088/14, 40127/14, 
European Court of Human Rights, First section, judgment of 15 October 2015. 
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the first judgment adopted by the European Court of Human Rights in the 
context of the Syrian conflict (since most European countries do not at 
present carry out involuntary returns to Syria but process Syrian claims). The 
Court accepted that the applicants ‘originated from Aleppo and Damascus, 
where heavy and indiscriminate fighting has been raging since 2012’,84 and 
concluded that ‘if the applicants were expelled to Syria, it would be in breach 
of Articles 2 and/or 3 of the Convention’.85  
The Court also referred to a policy summary published by the UK 
Home Office in 2014 according to which ‘Internal relocation within Syria to 
escape any risk from indiscriminate violence is extremely unlikely to be 
possible or reasonable’ due to the unpredictability of the violence, the 
humanitarian situation for internally displaced, and the very limited ability to 
move safely within Syria.86  
Whilst only safeguarding the applicants against their refoulement to 
Syria, it may be argued that, read in conjunction with other judgments of the 
European Court of Human Rights on minimum standards of protection 
expected to be provided to asylum seekers in the country of return,87 this 
finding requires the contracting party to guarantee admission to the territory 
and access to certain basic rights (which are both also core elements of the 
rule of temporary refuge). It may further be noted that Article 3 of the ECHR 
links directly to subsidiary protection under EU law;88 the latter, unlike the 
former, comes with a legal status similar to refugee status. 
 
In conclusion, the analysis above indicates that temporary refuge has become 
a cornerstone of states response in cases of large-scale influx of refugees. 
The rule is distinctly rooted in shared responsibility and the search for durable 
solutions through international cooperation. Its scope includes a duty on all 
states to offer immediate admission to territory for a limited duration (usually 
the duration of the conflict). It also includes an obligation to provide certain 
minimum rights, including non-refoulement and basic socio-economic rights, 
until a more durable solution is found (e.g., asylum, resettlement, or voluntary 
repatriation). Its normative value (and distinct roots in shared responsibility) is 
further set out in UN General Assembly declarations and resolutions, 89 
UNHCR EXCOM conclusions,90 and regional instruments. Scant authority in 
the case law of international courts does not undermine this conclusion. 




87 MSS v. Belgium and Greece, application no. 30696/09, Grand Chamber, 
judgment of 21 January 2011, and Sufi and Elmi v. United Kingdom, 
applications nos. 8319/07 and 11449/07, Fourth Section, judgment of 28 June 
2011.  
88 See Article 15b of the EU Qualification Directive. 
89 The fact that relevant UNGA resolutions were adopted without vote does 
not undermine their authority as evidence of international organisations’ 
practice.  
90  UNHCR EXCOM members currently total 98 states, including Jordan, 
Lebanon, Turkey, and most EU countries; ratification of the Refugee 
Convention/Protocol is not a requirement. The EU has observer status. 
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III. PERTINENT ELEMENTS OF CURRENT PRACTICES PURSUANT 
TO THE RULE OF TEMPORARY REFUGE 
 
Customary international law emerges from ‘evidence of a general practice 
accepted as law’. 91  These two elements (practice and opinio juris) are 
sometimes ‘closely entangled’ and ‘the relative weight to be given to each 
might vary according to the circumstances’, but they are ‘indispensable’.92 
Thus evidence of both elements is commonly found in the same materials, 
although each must be ascertained individually. 93 General practice means 
primarily the practice of states.94 
To identify current practices in the Syrian case, this article draws on the 
following: conduct on the ground in Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, and in the EU 
and its member states; conduct in connection with and independently from the 
Refugee Convention and/or EU law; public statements by the governments of 
these countries; and national legislations, including newly enacted legislative 
acts. This material was examined for the purpose of identifying the 
admissions practices of these countries independently and separately from 
treaty or EU law, the number of refugees they have been taking in or have 
allowed to stay, and the status granted to these people (temporary or 
permanent protection). Particular challenges are associated with identifying 
current practices in countries that primarily rely on the Refugee Convention or 
EU law (namely EU Member States). 
To ascertain opinio juris, this article looks at the following: conclusions 
of the Executive Committee (EXCOM) of the UNHCR relating to temporary 
refuge (refer to section II B above);95 enactment in domestic law;96 official 
                                                        
91 Article 38(1)(b), Statute of the International Court of Justice. See also for a 
recent pronouncement, ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany 
v. Italy, Greece Intervening, Judgment of 03 February 2012, para. 55 
92  ILC, Identification of customary international law, Text of the draft 
conclusions provisionally adopted by the Drafting Committee, 67th Session of 
the ILC, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.869, 14 July 2015, draft conclusion 3(2). See also, 
ICJ, North Sea Continental Shelf cases (Federal Republic of 
Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands), Judgment of 
20 February 1969, paras.74, and 77; ICJ, Military and Paramilitary Activities in 
and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, 
Judgment of 27 June 1986, para. 207; and M Wood (Special Rapporteur to 
the International Law Commission), ‘Second report on identification of 
customary international law’, UNGA 22 May 2014, A/CN.4/672, paras.3 and 
23. 
93 M Wood (Special Rapporteur to the ILC), ‘Third report on identification of 
customary international law’, UNGA 27 March 2015, A/CN.4/682 para.18. 
94ICJ, North Sea Continental Shelf cases, para. 74. See also R Jennings and 
A Watts (eds), Oppenheim’s International Law Vol.1 (Longman 9th Edition 
1996), at p.26. 
95  UNHCR EXCOM members currently total 98 states, including Jordan, 
Lebanon, Turkey, and most EU countries; hence ratification of the Refugee 
Convention/Protocol is not a requirement. The EU has observer status. 
Conduct in connection with UNGA resolutions on temporary refuge related 
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publications; and public statements by state officials regarding the duty to 
provide temporary refuge, bearing in mind that sovereignty is strongly present 
in this area and that such statement may be couched in cautious language.  
With regard to the latter, a particularly thorny issue concerns law and 
morals. The law applicable to refugees is deeply moral in that it is grounded 
on humanitarian principles and values. The argument has been made that in a 
context such as human rights, where ‘the stakes are high’ and the ‘customary 
norm is not morally neutral’, it is difficult to ignore public statements based on 
and accepted as having a moral character. 97  However, such ‘conceptual 
stretching’ has been met with criticism by proponents of the traditional 
approach to the formation and identification of customary international law.98 
Be that as it may, this article embraces Gerety’s position that ‘Law does in 
some imperfect sense mean morality; and similarly morality means law’,99 as 
best fitting situations of large numbers of refugees in dire need of emergency 
protection. 
 Next section discusses the approaches taken by Turkey, Jordan, 
Lebanon, and the EU, in implementing temporary refuge in the context of 
refugees from Syria. 
 
IV. TESTING THE RULE OF TEMPORARY REFUGE IN THE 
CONTEXT OF THE SYRIAN CONFLICT 
 
The Syrian conflict has created the largest refugee crisis today, and ‘is poised 
to become … the largest protracted refugee situation of the decade’.100 Since 
the conflict began in April 2011, five million refugees have fled Syria; the vast 
                                                                                                                                                              
matters was not considered relevant as all relevant resolutions were adopted 
without vote. 
96 Note that there are no decisions of national courts on temporary refuge (or 
temporary protection), in contrast with the large number of decisions on 
refugee protection or subsidiary/complementary protection. 
97 M Wood (Special Rapporteur to the ILC), ‘First report on formation an 
evidence of customary international law’, UNGA 17 May 2013, A/CN.4/663’, at 
p.51, footnote 245 referring to J Wouters and C Ryngaert, ‘Impact on the 
Process of the Formation of Customary International Law’ in MT Kamminga 
and M Scheinin (eds.), The Impact of Human Rights Law on General 
International Law (Oxford University Press, 2009). 
98 For a full discussion, see Wood, First report, pp.52-53. ILC draft conclusion 
9(1) refers to state practice being ‘undertaken with a sense of legal right or 
obligation’ and does not elaborate on the place of morality. 
99 T Gerety, ‘Sanctuary: A comment on the ironic relation between law and 
morality’, in DA Martin (ed) The New Asylum Seekers: Refugee Law in the 
1980s (Martinus Nijhoff, 1988), 159-180, at 174 – discussing the 1982 US law 
making the sanctuary of an alien, not lawfully entitled to enter or reside within 
the US, a federal crime. 
100 High Commissioner’s Dialogue on Protection Challenges, ‘Understanding 
and addressing root causes of displacement’, Preliminary Concept Paper, 
Geneva 7 August 2015, para.3. 
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majority of them have sought refuge into neighbouring countries.101 A third of 
the Syrian population has been displaced within Syria (approximately seven 
million).102 The conflict has also created a longer-term crisis within Syria as a 
result of ‘the bombing of schools, hospitals and other civilian installations’.103 
This section examines custom-based practices in the response to the large-
scale influx of Syrian refugees, by countries both near and afar to Syria, with a 
view to identifying how the existing customary obligation of temporary refuge 
has been implemented.  
 
A. The response by Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan: temporary refuge 
 
None of the Syrian ‘refugees’ in the region have been recognised as refugees 
under the Refugee Convention. Hence, the response of these countries is 
useful in identifying current practice on temporary refuge without the 
interference of treaty law. 
 
1. Turkey: temporary protection 
Turkey has a long-standing practice of keeping its borders open in cases of 
mass influx of refugees (which it refers to as ‘guests’). This practice goes back 
to WWII and the unconditional admission and hosting of Jews, Bulgarian, 
Turks (‘kindreds’) in 1944, 1968, and 1989, and more recently Afghans, Iraqis 
and Syrians. 104  According to the Turkish Government, this practice is in 
compliance with international law. 105  For the last two years, Turkey has 
hosted the largest refugee population in the world (over 2.5 million).106 
Turkey is a party to both the Refugee Convention and the Refugee 
Protocol. However, it maintains a geographical limitation to the effect that only 
asylum seekers from countries of the Council of Europe can be ‘Convention 
refugees’.107 Thus, the Refugee Convention has limited application.  
Turkey is also a party to the ECHR, the UN Convention Against 
                                                        
101  http://www.unhcr.ie/about-unhcr/facts-and-figures-about-refugees. 
Between April 2011 and April 2016, 1,037,760 Syrians have claimed asylum 
in 37 European countries - UNHCR last updated 10 June 2016: 
http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php 
102 By January 2016, more than 250,000 Syrians had been killed and 1.2 
million injured (Co-host Declaration of the Supporting Syria and the Region 
Conference, London, 4 February 2016). 
103 UNSC, Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security 
Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014) and 2191 (2014) and 2258 
(2015), S/2016/1057, 14 December 2016, p.17. 
104  K Kirisçi, ‘Syrian Refugees and Turkey’s Challenges: Going Beyond 
Hospitality’, Brookings, 2014, 14.  
105 Republic of Turkey, Prime Ministry Office of Public Diplomacy, ‘Turkey as 






Torture, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 108 
Hence, an argument could be made that Turkey’s obligation of non-
refoulement and granting certain basic rights (which are both elements of the 
rule of temporary refuge), may instead be based on treaty law.109 Be that as it 
may, these treaty obligations post-date Turkey’s practice of temporary refuge. 
Furthermore, there is no evidence that Turkey’s conduct was in fact based on 
provisions of the ECHR or other human rights treaties. Thus the source of 
obligation for opening borders to large numbers of refugees fleeing war and 
violence and granting certain basic rights seems more convincingly based on 
customary-based practice than treaty law.110  
 In 2013, the practice of temporary refuge was incorporated in Turkey’s 
first comprehensive Law on Foreigners and International Protection.111 Article 
91 of the 2013 Law provides: 
 
(1) Temporary protection may be provided for foreigners who have been 
forced to leave their country, cannot return to the country that they 
have left, and have arrived at or crossed the borders of Turkey in a 
mass influx situation seeking immediate and temporary protection.112 
 
Article 7 of Regulation No.29153 (2014) further specifies that beneficiaries of 
temporary protection may be anyone ‘to whom international protection status 
determination procedures do not apply’. Today, persons benefitting from 
temporary protection include all Syrian nationals, Palestinian refugees, and 
stateless persons living in Syria. 
Temporary protection under this Regulation includes (a) unconditional 
admission under the open border policy; (b) compliance with the principle of 
non-refoulement, including non-rejection at the border; (c) provision of basic 
                                                        
108  Article 3 ECHR, Article 3 CAT and Article 7 ICCPR have all been 
interpreted as guaranteeing non-refoulement, see H Lambert, ‘Protection 
against refoulement from Europe: Human rights law comes to the rescue’, 48 
(1999) International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 515-544. 
109 It may also be based on the customary international law rule of non-
refoulement; see E Lauterpacht and D Bethlehem, ‘The scope and content of 
the principle of non-refoulement: opinion’ in E Feller, V Turk and F Nicholson 
(eds) Refugee Protection in International Law – UNHCR’s Global 
Consultations on International Protection (Cambridge 2003) 87-164 (arguing 
for non-refoulement to have become a rule of customary international law). 
110 Reliance on the UNHCR Statute does not change this conclusion because 
although the Statute provides a definition of refugees akin to that in Article 
1A(2) of the Refugee Convention (as revised by the 1967 Protocol), it is not a 
treaty but ‘the defining document for the organization’s structure and powers’. 
Lewis, UNHCR and International Refugee Law, 13. 
111 The Law does not affect Turkey’s geographical limitation to the Refugee 
Convention, which therefore remains. 
112 Law No. 6458, Official Gazette, No. 28615, April 11, 2013, 
http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2013/04/20130411-2.htm. The Law 
entered into force on 11 April 2014. A newly set up General Directorate of 
Migration Management (within the Ministry of the Interior) is responsible for its 
implementation, and therefore for granting Temporary Protection. 
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needs and access to rights on a temporary basis.113 However, the provision of 
basic needs and access to rights is subject to the discretion of administrative 
authorities; significantly also the duration of temporary protection is 
discretionary (it is subject to a decision of the board of ministers). 114  At 
present no time limit applies to Syrians, but after more than five years, 
temporary protection is developing into de facto permanent resettlement in 
Turkey.  
The introduction of a national database system (launched by the 
Directorate General of Migration Management in May 2015), coupled with a 
strengthening of the registration capacity of the Turkish Government through 
a new Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP),115 and arguably the EU-
Turkey deal,116 means that Turkey should continue to keep its borders open 
and admit Syrian refugees. In reality, since 2016, Turkey has begun forcibly 
returning (‘refouler’) large numbers of Syrian refugees arriving by land at its 
Southern border with Syria, in contravention of its own law, international law, 
and EU law.117 
 In summary, two years after Syrian refugees began to cross the 
border, Turkey adopted its first legislation on temporary protection. This new 
legal framework appears to have successfully implemented Turkey’s long-
standing custom-based practice of temporary refuge (albeit the quality of 
protection for Syrian refugees is subject to discretion and restrictions). 
However, the expected collective response of the international community to 
alleviate the burden on Turkey has not been forthcoming. Thus what started 
as short-term humanitarian assistance has progressively turned into de facto 
permanent resettlement. 
                                                        
113 Regulation (‘by-law’) No.29153 on Temporary Protection - the Regulation 
entered into force on 22 October 2014. 
114  Ineli-Ciger, ‘Implications for the New Turkish Law on Foreigners and 
International Protection and Regulation no.29153 on Temporary Protection for 
Syrians Seeking Protection in Turkey’, (2014) Oxford Monitor of Forced 
Migration, 32-33. 
115 3RP Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan 2016-2017 in Response to the 
Syria Crisis, Turkey. The Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan is a new 
global initiative for the UN, the first of its kind, in terms of its response to 
crises; it was launched in Ankara in December 2014. ‘It is an inclusive model 
for delivering an effective, comprehensive, and coordinated response which 
addresses, through national plans, immediate vulnerabilities, strengthens 
social cohesion, and builds the resilience of people, communities and national 
system’ – http://www.bmdergi.org/en/the-regional-refugee-and-resilience-plan-
3rp-launched-in-ankara/ 
116  The EU-Turkey deal provides that for every Syrian being returned to 
Turkey from the Greek islands, another Syrian will be resettled to the EU - 
EU-Turkey statement, 18 March 2016, Press Release 144/16, 18/03/3016 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/press-releases-
pdf/2016/3/40802210113_en.pdf 
See also Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 2109 (2016), 





2. Jordan and Lebanon: temporary ‘hosting’ 
Neither Jordan nor Lebanon is a signatory to the Refugee Convention or 
Refugee Protocol. Hence, refugees from Syria do not benefit from any special 
status and must obtain entry and stay documentation in accordance with 
domestic law. In Jordan, for instance, they are often referred to as ‘visitors’, 
‘guests’ or ‘Arab brothers’, i.e., terms with no legal meaning under domestic 
law.118 In Lebanon, an asylum seeker means ‘a person seeking asylum in a 
country other than Lebanon’.119 Both countries are nevertheless parties to the 
UN Convention Against Torture and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, 120  but like in Turkey, custom-based practices of opening 
borders to people fleeing violence have existed long before these treaties 
were ratified, and there is no evidence that these countries’ conduct was in 
fact based on provisions in these treaties.  
Jordan and Lebanon have for decades hosted a particularly large 
number of Palestinian refugees following the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict and the 
1967 war pending repatriation. This custom continued between 2011 and 
2015, with both countries operating a policy largely about keeping its borders 
open to Syrian refugees, for humanitarian reasons.121 By 2016, Lebanon was 
hosting approximately 1.2 million refugees from Syria (i.e., a quarter of its 
population pre-2011 and the third largest refugee-hosting country in the world) 
and Jordan 665,000 (as registered Syrian refugees).122  
However, in January 2013, the Jordanian government officially 
announced a policy of non-entry for Palestinian refugees from Syria (on the 
ground that they should be allowed to return to Israel and Palestine) and 
                                                        
118 International Labour Organisation, Regional Office for Arab States, ‘Access 
to work for Syrian refugees in Jordan: A discussion paper on labour and 
refugee laws and policies’, 30 March 2015, at 12. 
119 Memorandum of Understanding between the UNHCR and the Government 
of Lebanon (2003). See also M Janmyr, ‘Legal Status of Syrian Refugees in 
Lebanon’, Working Paper 33 Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and 
Internal Affairs, Beirut, March 2016, at 7. 
120 However, Jordan is not a party to the Optional Protocol to the Convention 
Against Torture and neither Jordan nor Lebanon are parties to First Optional 
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
121 H Naufal, Syrian Refugees in Lebanon: the Humanitarian Approach under 
Political Divisions, Migration Policy Centre Research Report 2012/13, 24 
September 2012, 12; C Thibos, ‘One million Syrians in Lebanon: A milestone 
quickly passed’, Migration Policy Centre, European University Institute (2014), 
at 1; L Achilli, ‘Syrian Refugees in Jordan: a Reality Check’, Migration Policy 
Centre, European University Institute, February 2015, at 3. 
122  Lebanon’s policy of not setting formal camps for Syrian refugees has 
meant that the great majority of refugees live in some of the poorest 
neighbourhoods, where opportunities for employment are almost inexistent; 
ECHO Factsheet – Lebanon: Syrian crisis – May 2016, at 2. In Jordan, 
approximately half of Syrian refugees are registered with UNHCR and receive 
humanitarian assistance and shelter from the organization; the other half live 
outside camps, in some of the poorest parts of the country; UNHCR 
Operational Update – Jordan - May 2016. 
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those already living in Jordan were denied identification cards, resulting in 
non-access to basic services and in children only being able to enrol in 
UNRWA schools.123 Such discriminatory restrictions on entry and denials of 
refuge to Palestinians fleeing Syria are not specific to Jordan and extend to 
Lebanon and Egypt, forcing Palestinians from Syria to travel to Turkey or 
Europe;124 these restrictions appear consistent with Resolution 5093 adopted 
by the Council of the League of Arab States, which authorizes host countries 
in the region to treat Palestinian refugees in accordance with their own 
domestic law.125  
Under increased pressure in all sectors (employment, education, 
health, housing, water and electricity supply), Lebanon and Jordan have also 
introduced general restrictions on entry into their territory since 2015. For 
instance, the Lebanese Government instated visa restrictions for Syrian 
nationals, coupled with tight time limit of stay ranging from 24 hours to one 
month. 126  These have generally resulted in instances of refoulement and 
arbitrary detention becoming more frequent.127 Other restrictive measures that 
were introduced include fees for Syrian refugees to access public health 
centres, with an exception for vulnerable families.128 
 The legal and policy frameworks of Jordan and Lebanon to address the 
situation of refugees remain underdeveloped and unable to cope with the 
challenges of their national economic needs. Both countries have signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding with the UNHCR (Jordan in 1998; Lebanon in 
2003), stating key principles of international protection, but these have limited 
application to Syrian refugees. 129  With offers of resettlement outside the 
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region continuing to be low in numbers,130 plans for local integration are now 
being pursued through the Migration Compact (which builds on the EU-Turkey 
deal)131 and Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP),132 at the same 
time as advocating positive measures to offer admission to territory.133  
 
3. Conclusion 
Since the Syrian conflict began in April 2011, official statements and the 
conduct of the governments of Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan have 
demonstrated (until recently) an open border approach; inherent to this 
practice is the admission of large numbers of refugees to territory, respect for 
non-refoulement, and the recognition of certain minimum rights for refugees. 
This policy seems to be based on long-standing custom-based regional 
practices of offering temporary refuge to persons in need (e.g., Palestinians in 
Lebanon and Jordan, and the ‘kindreds’ in Turkey). While Turkey’s legal and 
policy framework to address the protection needs of Syrian refugees has 
developed into a proper temporary protection legal regime, Jordan’s and 
Lebanon’s has remained rudimentary.  
None of the Syrian refugees have been protected under the Refugee 
Convention (or Refugee Protocol), which is inapplicable in these three 
countries (Jordan and Lebanon are not parties; Turkey only recognises 
refugees coming from Europe). It is therefore suggested that these countries 
constitute successful examples of implementation of the existing customary 
obligation to provide temporary refuge to large numbers of refugees. 
 However, what started as short-term humanitarian assistance has 
since turn into a protracted situation, creating pressure on resources for 
Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon. The governments of these countries feel deeply 
let down by the international community of states and the lack of shared 
responsibility,134 as temporary refuge is transitioning to de facto permanent 
resettlement in all three countries. Parallel to this, a tightening of entry into 
territory and the range of rights provided can be observed. The Syrian case 
seems to confirm historical examples that there is no precise time when it 
comes to the ‘temporariness’ of temporary refuge. However, after five years of 
conflict, the patience and resources of countries of refuge has run out, the 
emergency scenario has withered away, and shared responsibility has 
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become even more imperative.  
 As will be discussed below, the EU’s approach contrasts starkly with 
that of Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon. 
 
B. The response of the EU and its member states: international protection 
(asylum) 
 
The response of the EU to the arrival of refugees from Syria has been slow 
and idiosyncratic, raising serious concerns about the future of the Common 
European Asylum System.135 Both the EU Temporary Protection Directive136 
and Article 78(3) (together with Article 80) of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union 137  foresee a solidarity mechanism in the case of a 
sudden influx of refugees.  
The Temporary Protection Directive (which is illustrative of opinio juris), an 
instrument adopted under the Common European Asylum System, provides a 
wide personal scope and flexible eligibility criteria. In particular, it does not 
require a status determination procedure because membership in the 
designated group is sufficient, and it would apply to a significant number of 
people, such as all people from a particular country or region (e.g., Syria). 
Furthermore, it requires the member states to ensure that the temporary and 
immediate protection status it offers includes certain guarantees.138 Finally, it 
provides for financial assistance, and a structured burden sharing mechanism 
to the extent that member states would notify each other of their reception 
capacity but not actually undertake sharing or redistribution of asylum 
seekers. Compared to existing refugee resettlement and humanitarian 
admission programmes (both limited in their personal scope, for instance to 
unaccompanied children or family members), the Temporary Protection 
Directive would therefore offer considerable advantages.139  
However, the Directive has never been activated; individual member 
states preferring instead to apply protection statuses by application of the 
                                                        
135 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
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Refugee Convention/EU Qualification Directive.140 For instance, in 2013 most 
EU countries granted subsidiary protection status to Syrian refugees already 
present in Europe; 141 in 2014 and 2015, the UNHCR noted a welcoming 
increase in the granting of refugee status, for instance on actual or imputed 
political ground to asylum seekers from Syria.142  
Time may also be relevant in that Syrian refugees did not arrive on EU’s 
doorsteps until much later (summer 2015). By then it had been decided that 
the collective priority should be to support Syria and the region through 
funding, protect Europe’s borders, and agree durable solutions (e.g., a small 
number of resettlement) while considering other humanitarian options for 
accessing Europe. 
Thusly, Article 78(3) (together with Article 80) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union was used instead (of the Temporary 
Protection Directive) as a basis for collective EU action, including the adoption 
of a European Agenda on Migration.143 The Agenda was followed by a set of 
Priority Actions for its implementation, namely, national financial pledges, 
member states’ support to an emergency relocation mechanism of 160,000 
people already in the EU, a new ‘hotspot’ approach, and ensuring effective 
returns pursuant to the EU action plan on return;144 none of these involved 
temporary protection. 
Resettlement measures were also adopted to enable refugees from Syria 
to lawfully access and settle in the EU. Resettlement in EU law guarantees 
the person being resettled one of the following statuses: refugee status,145 
subsidiary protection status,146 or any other similar status under national or 
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EU law. Hence it offers a more permanent solution than for instance 
humanitarian admission programmes, which are meant to be only 
temporary.147 As a durable solution, resettlement is not therefore pertinent to 
examining the custom-based practice of temporary refuge/temporary 
protection; the number of actual places for resettlement in the EU has also 
been small.148 
Other safe and lawful options to access the EU include humanitarian visa 
and humanitarian admission programmes, 149  private sponsorship, 150 
emergency scholarships for higher education, 151  vulnerable persons 
relocation scheme,152 and family reunification programme.153 Most of these 
options are not relevant either to examining a distinctive custom-based 
practice of temporary refuge because they are based on the Refugee 
Convention or EU law. For instance, France has been using humanitarian 
visas for Syrians but pre-assessment at French consulates in Syria and 
neighbouring countries is entirely based on the Refugee Convention and rules 
for subsidiary protection. 154  Similarly, Syrians granted admission under 
humanitarian admission programmes introduced in Austria, France and the 
UK, have been granted refugee status or subsidiary protection upon arrival, 
hence they were not offered ‘temporary refuge’ but asylum (or quasi-
resettlement) as a durable solution.155  
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One possible exception is the humanitarian admission programmes 
established in Ireland and Germany, which seem to have considered 
temporary protection at some point in time. However, the Irish Syrian 
Humanitarian Admission Programme (SHAP) was very limited in scope: it was 
only in place for six weeks (in Spring 2014) and only 44 applications for 119 
family members were granted;156 it operated as a private (family) sponsorship 
mechanism and offered up to two years residence in Ireland.157 Where family 
members could no longer meet the financial requirements or at the expiry of 
the two-year period, most beneficiaries were able to apply for refugee 
status. 158  As for Germany, it introduced three humanitarian admission 
programmes, between March 2013 and April 2014. The programmes offered 
a total of 20,000 places to Syrians in Lebanon and Egypt. This was the first 
time a European country committed ‘to large-scale, ad-hoc admission of 
Syrians outside of regular resettlement quotas’. 159  Syrians arriving in 
Germany under one of these programmes were originally granted two-year 
temporary residency with the possibility of renewal for another two years. 
However, like in other EU countries, they have since been allowed to stay 
permanently.  
It may be worth noting that the European Commission recently embarked 
in a comprehensive reform of its asylum policy to address the challenges of 
high migratory pressure. 160  Core to the reform is the introduction of a 
‘compulsory status review’ to ensure that protection is granted only for as long 
as it is needed taking into account, for example, changes in countries of origin 
which could impact the need for protection.161 It is therefore predicted that 
cases of return of persons recognised as needing protection at a particular 
time, from Europe to countries of origin will likely increase in future. 
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To conclude, the EU has not considered it necessary to activate its own 
solidarity mechanism, namely the Temporary Protection Directive. In such 
absence, EU member states have responded to claims by Syrians in the 
usual way through their procedures for international protection – examining 
their eligibility for refugee status under the Refugee Convention first, and then, 
if they are not recognised as refugees, whether they are eligible for subsidiary 
protection under EU law. It is therefore unlikely that in the absence of a 
collectively activated temporary protection mechanism, the rule of temporary 
refuge applies in the EU with respect to refugees from Syria. One narrow 
exception might be humanitarian admission programmes in Germany and 
possibly also Ireland, which at some point in time considered protection for 
Syrian refugees to be granted on a temporary basis. The response of the EU 
therefore contrasts starkly with the practices of Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan; 
it further highlights key challenges in identifying current practices in countries 





This article has examined the customary international law rule of temporary 
refuge in relation to the Syrian conflict (2011-). The rule, which was first 
acknowledged in the legal literature in the 1980s, enshrines a positive 
obligation on all states to admit to territory large numbers of persons fleeing a 
situation of armed conflict, and to grant certain rights commensurate with 
human dignity, until a more durable solution is found. The application of the 
rule further triggers an obligation on states and international organisations to 
cooperate and to take concrete steps towards a durable solution. Insufficiently 
recognised in the academic literature and demonstrated in this article, is that 
shared responsibility is the linchpin of temporary refuge.  
The practices in neighbouring countries to Syria (i.e., Turkey, Lebanon 
and Jordan) during the last five years indicate that when the Refugee 
Convention is not the available tool, temporary refuge has been relied on as a 
basis for protection in large-scale influx of refugees. The response of these 
countries, which has been to keep their borders open to refugees from Syria, 
is based on long standing custom-based practices in the region of providing 
temporary refuge. In Turkey, the rule has also been enshrined in a new 
legislation.  
These practices further confirm that temporary refuge applies to a 
wider category of people than refugee status because the circumstances of 
flight do not have to be covered by the terms of the Refugee Convention. 
Temporary refuge also appears to include a positive obligation to offer 
admission to territory (e.g., through keeping borders open) that is distinct from 
the negative obligation of non-refoulement. Finally, temporary refuge supports 
states’ obligation to protect certain essential human rights to everyone within 
their territory, e.g., non-refoulement, non-discrimination, education, and other 
human rights commensurate with human dignity, independently from any 
status under refugee law. This is crucial and goes to the heart of 
‘understanding protractedness’ not just in terms of time but also in terms of 
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marginalization, threats to freedom, and dependency.162 However after five 
years of conflict, rights are becoming squeezed and shared responsibility 
towards permanent solutions even more needed. 
The EU, in contrast, offers a very different approach. Despite 
temporary refuge having found expression explicitly in EU law (in the 
Temporary Protection Directive), EU member states decided not to activate 
this mechanism, considering instead that the numbers of asylum seekers 
involved could simply be processed through national procedures for 
international protection. As a result, most refugees from Syria have been 
granted refugee status or subsidiary protection status under the Refugee 
Convention or EU Qualification Directive. In sharp contrast with Turkey, 
Lebanon and Jordan, the approach in the EU has remained focused on the 
individual and refugee/subsidiary protection status as a solution. With the 
exception of Germany, none of the humanitarian admission programmes 
come near the large-scale ad-hoc admission of Syrians outside of durable 
solutions (such as resettlement), and even in this case, beneficiaries of these 
programmes ended up being granted permanent residence. 
The fact that the EU has not applied the Temporary Protection 
Directive should not be read as a rejection by EU member states of the 
practice of temporary refuge, given that these countries did engage in such 
practice in response to the former Yugoslavia and Kosovo wars, and 
subsequently codified such practice in the Temporary Protection Directive 
itself. The EU case does, however, represent a failure of shared (EU) 
responsibility, in failing to activate the optimum mechanism for dealing with 
the Syria crisis. This left member states to apply different solutions producing 
variance in the scale and level of protection afforded to Syrian refugees. 
Temporary refuge is practiced the world over, and has been codified in 
regional legal instruments in Europe, Africa, Asia, as well as in national law in 
the United States and Turkey for instance; but as long as shared responsibility 
is lacking, the rule is likely to continue being implemented primarily in a 
regional context by countries the nearest to the country affected by conflict, as 
seen in the case of Syria.  
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